as it relegates principles of international law at the same degree of custom and treaty law, emerges in this case even an interpretative incoherence with regard to the Constitutional provisions under exam.
International treaties in particular, as well as conventional International law in general, bind the signatory Part because a formal principle of International law (that originates from the auctoritas of the International community) -exactly, the pacta sunt sevanda principle -prescribes this juridical effect 5 . For these reason, the ratio of this presumable «equalization» between primary and secondary norms of international law within art. 5 of the Constitution should be interpreted as a clear intention of the constituent to extend to duly ratified treaties the same constitutional guarantees; that does not imply any substantial equalization of these norms 6 . International treaties, as any other international instrument subject to ratification, «become part» of the (Albanian) domestic law only as a consequence of completion of internal procedures of ratification, properly sanctioned in the Constitution; the act of ratifications has only a subconstitutional rank (art. 116, § 1, Const.) 7 . Constitutional, in this case, is only the principle binding upon the State with regard to proper international obligations; that is nothing else but the tout court «internalization» of the pacta sunt servanda principle. According to the Constitution, International treaties, duly ratified, «become part» of the Albanian legal system and, in the hierarchy of the sources, occupy an «intermediate» position between Constitution and ordinary law of the State 8 . c) At this point, a particular attention should be granted to the question of the collocation of human rights law in the constitutional framework. The communist model of the so-called «popular democracy», in force in Albania before the Nineties, used to consider the respect and guarantee of human rights direct and natural consequence of the social and economic equality of the citizens. This equality should have been reached only after the transformation of the economic bourgeois relationships in economic socialist ones, with no class conflict that produces oppressors and oppressed; all would have implied the real equality of the citizens. Only with the elimination of the social and economic inequalitydistinguishing element of the capitalist society, according to Marxism -highest human rights guarantee and protection standards could have been reached.
To be more precise, fundamental rights and liberties, though being formally sanctioned in the Constitution, were strictly conditioned on the economic relationships of the communist society; they were the superstructural reflection of (socialist) production relations. As long as the relations between individuals were not characterized by the class conflict dialectics (between bourgeois and proletarians, to be clear) even individual rights -considered, exactly, a superstructure -would have been the reflection of this relations and would have not been affected by any inequality.
The institute of human rights and its relative guaranties, as an integral part of the socialist public order, according to this theory, concurs to the indisputable goal of the socialism: «the progressive development of the popular democracy and the satisfaction of all the material and cultural needs of the workers» 9 (intended the latter as the unique ruling class in the socialist society). This kind of juridical relativism 10 , contrarily of what emerges in bourgeois occidental societies, detailed solution [Part VII] [art. 116 Const.] . The Constitution holds the supremacy over all legislative acts, duly ratified international treaties included [art. 116]», (OmariAnastasi, E drejta., cit., p. 55) . 5 «Se la consuetudine e l'accordo costituiscono dei procedimenti di produzione giuridica internazionale, ciò è dovuto esclusivamente al fatto che due principi, il principio consuetudo est servanda e quello pacta sunt servanda, vedono tali procedimenti idonei a creare diritto», (Quadri, Diritto internazionale pubblico, Napoli, 1968, p. 109) . For further consultation see even op. cit., Krisafi, Kushtetuta shqiptare dhe e drejta ndërkombetare (Albanian Constitution and International Law), in "5 vjet Kushtetutë", Tirana, 2004, pp. 100-111. 7 originates from the very basis of the socialist systems, inasmuch the norms concerning human rights protection are traditionally conditioned on the principle of the safeguard of the public order and the development of the socialist State 11 .
of the question of the relation [between international and internal law], determining a clear hierarchy between norms, the procedures of adoption of international law in the internal juridical order and the competencies of respective institutions involved. International treaties, duly ratified, occupy the second rank after the Constitution and assume intermediate force
Diametrically different is the new constitutional framework of the «occidental» Albania. The human rights had to be the inspiring principle of the democratic society 12 . The whole social, economic and legislative framework of the Country could not prescind from that essential and fundamental core of individual rights and liberties that characterizes the occidental model of society. So, in the same Constitution of 1998, was sanctioned in a clear and unequivocal way the compliance with the fundamental principles of the International community in the field of human rights 13 .
For what regards the rank that International human rights law occupies in the Albanian Constitution, the constituent, even on International experts recommendation, demonstrated particular attention and sensibility towards the European system of human rights protection. European Convention on Human Rights (echr) 14 became part of the constitutional provisions binding, in a direct and indisputable way, the legislative activity of the Parliament, particularly with regard to (potential) limitations of human rights in peremptory hypothesis of public interest and protection of rights of others 15 . Direct consequence of this mechanism is the exclusive competence of the constitutional judge to question the compatibility of the limitations in object with what permitted by echr, also in the light of the interpretations of the Court of Strasbourg 16 . Any failure to respect the European minimum standards, in this case, would be considered a violation of art. 17 of the Constitution and thus declared unconstitutional by the (Constitutional) Court 17 . The constitutional placement of echr, although in «negative» terms of prohibition of limitations if violable of those permitted in the European system, represents an absolute originality for the human rights cause. In case the Parliament decided to restrict the core of human rights and liberties beyond limitations permitted by echr, the constitutional mechanism represents the perfect instrument in the hands of the guardian of the Constitution -the Constitutional Court -to invalidate, in legal ways, attempts of this kind.
Actually, the value of echr in the Albanian legal system has a double dimension: on one hand the Convention guarantees at constitutional rank the minimal core of human rights as provided for at European level placing an insuperable limit to any attempt of human rights restriction within the hole legal system; on the other hand, as sanctioned also in the art. 116 of the Constitution, the echr inasmuch as international agreement ratified by Parliament's law, assumes a pre-constitutional rank within the Albanian legal system and, thus, prevails on any contrary ordinary law 18 Bologna, 1975, Fasc. 1/4, p. 78 eventually, to declare their illegitimacy.
The same constitutional guarantee is extended to all international agreements in the field of human rights (and not only) given that the Constitution (art. 122, § 2) expressively provides for the prevalence of any duly ratified international agreement on ordinary law. Fall within this category the un Covenants on human rights of 1966 19 as well as all those international and regional instruments ratified by Albania in the human rights field 20 .
Democratic Standards and Human Rights
The change of the precedent political system towards the occidental model of society at the principle of the Nineties inevitably brought to the complete replacement of the old economic, social and legislative infrastructure of the Country. The result of this profound opening towards a liberal democratic society had to bring to radical transformations in the human rights conception. Starting from the Constitution of the 1998, the whole legislative activity of the rising democracy faced with the human rights question. It was not a question of producing (and introducing) à la carte, any human rights and liberties catalogue as already recognized and protected in other developed Countries; it had to do with the construction of the fundaments of a democratic society, guarantor of individual and collective human rights in a period when the heritage of the dark past publically and jealously challenged the embryonic democracy. In a country where human rights for almost fifty years have had an precarious and sometimes inexistent status, the sudden transformation used to request the demolition of the past totalitarian legislative structure.
Although any Constitution was not adopted immediately, at the beginning of the Nineties important goals were achieved. Though brief and provisional, the «Constitutional Chart» of 1991 21 sanctioned, for the first time at constitutional level, the defense and the fundamental guaranties in the human rights field 22 . The modest constitutional framework recognized, in the section dedicated to general provisions, the essential rights of the people under a perspective of equality of the citizens in front of the law 23 .
An important bill of rights issued on 1993 completed the provisional constitutional mosaic 24 . It was a catalogue of fundamental rights and liberties that sanctioned, for the first time in the Albanian legal system, the centrality and the dignity of the individual, rendering him a milestone of the whole society. Human rights and liberties, as sanctioned in all democratic Constitutions and guaranteed and protected in international Covenants, this time entered from the principal gate of the Albanian juridical order 25 . In addition, in accordance with the provisional Constitution, a criminal and procedure criminal code were approved 26 .
In practice, however, several problems related to the implementation of the human rights legislation framework emerged. As underlined even in non-governmental international organization's reports, during the first years of the Albanian transition the capacity of the Albanian society to guarantee the full enjoyment of human rights and liberties was seriously questioned 27 . The one-party mentality inherited by the old regime and the non independence of judiciary power from the executive and political one jeopardized the human rights cause 28 . During this embryonic period cases of violence exercised by police forces against individuals, restrictions of individual liberties as those of media, association and manifestation were registered 29 .
Anyway, steps forward with regard to political and civil rights as well as to economic and social rights are not to be ignored. The free enterprise was guaranteed at all levels without any distinction while the old-style economy of the country gradually transformed into a capitalistic model. But, following irregularities registered during the 1996 political elections, Albania faced the most serious institutional and political crisis of its transition 30 . The first step towards the general stabilization was the adoption of the 1998's Constitution.
With the adoption of this Constitution, followed by the general stabilization of the political situation, the legislative framework regarding human rights and liberties continued to improve. The new democratic Constitution endorsed the most important principles relating human rights and raised them to constitutional rank; (individual and collective) human rights and liberties finally lied in their natural habitat 31 . This constitutional catalogue does not only jealously safeguard the centrality of human rights in the Albanian legal culture but also aims to eradicate those archaic notions inherited from the old communist mentality according to which the unconditioned protection of human rights threatens the discretion of public institutions and challenges the State sovereignty 32 . The centrality and indefeasibility of human rights and dignity 33 A further fundamental element of the human rights protection system is certainly represented by the art. 17 of the Constitution 35 . From its analyze clearly emerge the peremptory hypothesis of human rights and liberties restriction: public interest and protection of rights of others; all in full and rigorous respect of the proportionality of the action and, most of all, only by the mean of a law of the Parliament. Furthermore, in any case, these restrictions or limitations shall never exceed those provided for in the echr. In this sense, the Constitutional Court, in a verdict of 2006, literally interpreting the article in question, firmly rejected the possibility of the Council of Ministers to intervene with proper acts (so-called normative acts) aiming the restriction or limitation of fundamental human rights and liberties stating that only the Parliament is the competent organ to legislate in similar cases 36 .
The Role of the ECHR and National Institutions in the Implementation of Human Rights Dispositions
A fundamental contribution in favor of the cause of human rights is given certainly by the institutions and organs provided for in the internal legal system. They are the principal actors invested with the arduous task of converting legal dispositions in concrete actions. In this sense, important organs as Constitutional Court, People's Advocate, judiciary power as well as all the organs of public administration are some of the most clear examples. It is also to be underlined the contribution given by the non-governmental organizations, international and not, inasmuch as defenders and sustainers of requests coming from the social base. In many cases they are bearers of experiences of exemplar social battles as those regarding death penalty, environmental rights, bioethics, rights of categories of emarginated persons, rights of women, of children as well as those in case of humanitarian crisis. The mosaic of the involved actors would not be complete without mentioning the undisputable role of the European Court of Human Rights (Court of Strasbourg) whose contribution to the cause of human rights in the Albanian society is (and has been) of fundamental incidence. If steps forward have been made in the field in question (which in certain aspects are indisputable), it is because of the joint distribution and coordination of the responsibilities among these same actors, serious interlocutors between public power and social base.
In this context, the Constitutional Court, in full and rigorous respect of its competences, left an indelible mark in favor of human rights cause. Considering echr (as well as the Constitution) a strong reference point, the Constitutional Court intervention has given further clarity to the core of human rights compelling even the legislator to take concrete legislative initiatives in order to render internal legislation compatible with echr 37 .
In other occasions, the Court has gone beyond the spirit of Rome Convention itself and its interpretations given by Constitution, see Court Verdict. n. 9 (2003); n. 29 (2005); n. 24 (2007); n. 39 (2007); n. 41 (2007) . 37 In this sense, the Constitutional Court in a decision of 1999 (Constitutional Court of Republic of Albania, Court Verdict n. 65, 10.12. 1999) 
found incompatible with the Constitution the internal dispositions concerning death penalty in peace time, present either in criminal code or in the military criminal one, on the basis of the argumentation that those dispositions contrast with the Constitution (art. 21 and others) and echr (Prot. No. 6). Although, at the time, Albania had not ratified the Protocol relative to the abolition of death penalty (this Protocol was entered into force in Albania on 1 October 2000) but had temporarily suspended executions, the Constitutional judge interpreted in an extensive way the significance of art. 17, § 2 of the Constitution, considering death penalty a negation, rather than a limitation, of the rights and liberties sanctioned in both instruments (Constitution and echr).
the Court of Strasbourg, extending for example, even on the basis of the interpretation of the Albanian Constitution, some criminal and civil procedural guaranties relative to the right to a fair trial even in hypothesis of administrative cases 38 . In several occasions the Court expressed its firm opposition in case of improper restriction or limitation of fundamental constitutional rights tracing a clear minimum threshold that should never be surpassed. Having to the Court been assigned the exclusive power of judge of the laws, even with reference to the Strasbourg's jurisprudence, it has repeatedly sanctioned that any indirect restriction of the right in object (right to a fair trial) provides sufficient evidence in order to censure prejudicial laws or conducts 39 . A further important element in the institutional geography of the constitutional bodies involved in the human rights question within the Albanian legal order is certainly represented by the figure of the Ombudsman, or People's Advocate 40 . The political independence and impartiality, deducible even by the qualified quorum (3/5 of the members of the Parliament) requested for its election, combined with the constitutional guaranties granted for carrying out proper functions render this institution an important factor in the achievement of human rights standards 41 . Though its competencies are circumscribed to issue recommendations towards institutions considered guilty for human rights violations, its legal capacity to solicit the intervention of the Constitutional Court [art. 134, § (f)] render it an active and effective institution in defense of human rights 42 .
Nor could be ignored in this occasion the undisputable contribution given by the Court of Strasbourg thanks to its decisions in favor of the human rights cause, especially for what regards cases concerning Albania 43 . The Court's jurisprudence is considered an essential point of reference for all the national judges within European continent while for what regards cases involving Albania, its decisions have contributed considerably to the improvement of the exact application of human rights dispositions.
The attention of the Court of Strasbourg, for what concerns cases relative to Albania, has been concentrated mostly, but not exclusively, on art. 6 of echr (the right to a fair trial). Aiming to give an as more as possible extensive interpretation of the right in object, the Court never lost the opportunity to firmly underline the importance of the substantial elements of the right to a fair trial; for example, in several occasions, the Court has affirmed with force that, according to art. 6, the «execution of a judgment given by any court must therefore be regarded as an integral part of the 38 Emblematic, but not solitary, the position of the Court in the Case Rakipi v. Parliament, Court Verdict n. 76, 25.04.2002, as Court Verdict n. 75, 19.04.2002. 39 The Court, though being essentially a judge of the laws, on the basis of proper competencies (art. 131 of the Const.) set strict limits with concern to individual's right to a fair trial creating the basis of a correct interpretation and comprehension of this right among all judicial operators. So, in Court Verdict n. 48 (1999); n. 15 (2000); n. 20 e 38 (2000); n. 3 e 4 (2001); n. 9 (2001); n. 17 (2001); n. 24 e 205 (2001); n. 25 (2002); n. 76 (2002); n. 109 (2002) of art. 6, art. 8, art. 13, art. 46 and art. 1, Prot. I. "trial" for the purposes of Article 6» 44 . In concrete terms, in the cases Qufaj Co. Sh.p.k. v. Albania (2004) and Balliu v. Albania (2005) , the «judge of Strasbourg», referring to consolidated jurisprudence, underlined that art. 6 of the Rome Convention does not concern only the right to a fair trial in the strict sense, but rather a set of minimal guaranties aiming an «effective remedy for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 of the Convention» 45 .
In other occasions, the Court of Strasbourg certified infringement of several rights and liberties sanctioned in the echr: in particular right to life (art. 2), prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment (art. 3), right to liberty and security (art. 5), nulla poena sine lege (art. 7), right to respect for private and family life (art. 8), right to effective remedy (art. 13), right to private property (art. 1, Prot. 1) etc..
In absence of any jurisprudential tradition in the field of human rights because of the non-importance of these during the communist regime as well as the inexistence of a Constitutional Court, the long and precious experience of the Court of Strasbourg offers a unique occasion to the Albanian constitutional (but even ordinary) judge in order to introduce in the domestic law standards already accepted at European level rendering effective, in the same time, those fundamental rights and liberties sanctioned in the Constitution and the laws of the country.
For what regards, instead, the operation and the contribution of the non-governmental organizations ( 46 . The lack of a civil society during almost fifty years of communism rendered too difficult the task of these NGOs in the new democratic dimension of the society 47 . This inexistence of civic responsibility tradition has been further on worsened by the unavailability of the ruling class to consider both NGOs and trade associations as direct interlocutors for the definition of the policy-making, inasmuch as representatives of the interests of society 48 . In consequence, the civic conscience of the Albanian society still remains fragile, thanks also to the strong political hostility and polarization that reigns in the Country which has brought sometimes, even to the politicization 44 With regard to art. 6 see Case of Marini v. Albania, 18.12.2007; Case of Driza v. Albania and Ramadhi and Others v. Albania 13.11.2007; Case of Xheraj v. Albania 29.07.2008; Case of Dauti v. Albania, 03.02.2009; Case of Behrami v. Albania, 27.05.2010 . 45 (Case of Qufaj Co. Sh.p.k. v. Albania, 18.11.2004, § 38 p. 187) . E-ISSN 2281 -4612 ISSN 2281 Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 4 No 3 S1 December 2015 187 of considerable part of civic elite exponents 49 ; this obviously generated loss of trust on public opinion towards them 50 .
Conclusive Remarks
In a country as Albania, where the indelible legacy of the disastrous experience of the past communist regime still threatens the progress of the rising democracy, the human rights question remains an open challenge. The actual situation in the country shows that steps forward have been made but there is still a lot to do 51 . It is not a challenge against; it's a challenge for the guarantee of human rights and liberties, for the construction of a society that gives voice to the interests and requirements of its members, that creates the necessary conditions in order that these rights and liberties become a common good at the service of proper citizens. We think there is no example to follow or emulate with fanaticism; the capacity of a well-governed society is expressed exactly in its ability to translate in concrete dispositions and actions the necessities for justice and liberty coming from the social base, in full respect of its history, culture and its best traditions. (Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2012. Albania, p. 49) . 50 (European Commission, Albania 2011 Progress Report, pp. 17-18) .
